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The Sensoty Core and the Medleval 
Foundations of Early Modern 
Perceptual Theory 
By Gary C. Hatfield* and William Epstein** 
N THE EIGHTEENTH and nineteenth centuries the majority of theories of visual 
perception were built upon the view that during the process of vision there occur 
two conscious states with quite different phenomenal properties. The first state is a 
mental representation of the two-dimensional retinal image. The second is our 
experience of the "visual world" of objects distributed in depth. According to the then 
commonly accepted theory, the mental correlate of the retinal image is the truly 
immediate component of perception, and it provides the raw material from which the 
mind generates the three-dimensional visual world. Yet this retinal correlate the 
"sensory core" of the perceptual process-typically goes unnoticed, and the perci- 
pient takes his experience of the three-dimensional visual world to be direct and 
unmediated.2 Although it may seem odd that an unnoticed state of consciousness 
should be viewed as the psychologically fundamental component of the visual 
process, that which we have labelled the "sensory core" has played a central role in 
visual theory since Berkeley drew his celebrated distinction between the immediate 
*Department of the History of Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706. 
**Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706. 
We wish to express gratitude to David C. Lindberg for helpful suggestions and critical comments on 
various drafts. This work was supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the National Science Founda- 
tion to the first author and by research grants 5R01 MH 26703 and lROI MH 31594 from the National 
Institute of Mental Health to the second author. 
'We have chosen to use the term "sensory core" to refer to a conscious state with the phenomenal 
properties of the retinal image, without arousing unwanted connotations about its psychological status (as, 
say, a form of experience produced by a special attitude) and without implying anything further about its 
epistemological status (as, say, an incorrigible "given"). Our "sensory core" shares the phenomenal 
properties of James Gibson's "visual field" (The Perception of the Visual World, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1950, Ch. 3). Our usage of the term "sensory core" is parallel to E. G. Boring's "core" of perception 
("The Perception of Objects," in Herschel W. Leibowitz, Visual Perception, New York: Macmillan, 1965, 
pp. 67-85, on pp. 69-70), a term which he derived from E. B. Titchener. Our usage does not correspond to 
Roderick Firth's (pp. 216-219 of "Sense-data and the Percept Theory," in R. Swartz, ed., Perceiving, 
Sensing and Knowing, Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, pp. 204-270), but our "sensory core" shares the 
phenomenal properties of the "sense-data" he attributes to Locke and Berkeley (pp. 215-216). 
2The 18th-century philosopher Thomas Reid summed up this position well in his discussion of "visible 
appearances" (his name for the sensory core). After remarking that these appearances "are never made the 
object of reflection, though almost every moment presented to the mind," he explained that "the mind has 
acquired a confirmed and inveterate habit of inattention to them; for they no sooner appear, than quick as 
lightning the thing signified [a solid object] succeeds, and engrosses all our regard. They have no name in 
language; and, although we are conscious of them when they pass through the mind, yet their passage is so 
quick and so familiar, that it is absolutely unheeded; nor do they leave any footsteps of themselves, either 
in the memory or imagination"; Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (4th ed.; Edinburgh, 
1785), Ch. 6, Sec. 3, in his Works, 2 vols., ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1863), Vol. I, p. 135. Reid's 
views were not anomalous; Nicholas Pastore, Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception (New 
York/ London: Oxford University Press, 1971), esp. Chs. 1-10, has shown that the concept of a mental 
representation of the retinal image was a central theme in 18th- and 19th-century perceptual theory. 
ISIS, 1979, 70 (No. 253) 363 
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364 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN 
and mediate objects of vision. This paper will explore the theoretical context within 
which the notion of a sensory core developed. 
Historically, the motivation for assigning the sensory core a content distinct from 
the visual world has come from geometrical optics. Unless it were believed that the 
spatial properties of objects as represented in the sense organ (say, by the retinal 
image) are different from the spatial properties of objects themselves, there would be 
no reason to question that perception of the visual world is simply a matter of directly 
apprehending the optical stimulation available at the retina. Consider the perception 
of a circle oblique to the line of sight. The circle projects an ellipse on the retina, yet a 
slanted circle is manifest in the visual world; the sensory core, in representing the 
retinal projection, thereby differs from the phenomenally direct apprehension of the 
circle. The postulation, on optical grounds, of a difference between the spatial 
attributes of objects themselves and the representation of those attributes in the 
stimulus pattern is logically anterior to the concept of sensory core, for without the 
supposition of such a difference, mere reception of the stimulus (which would now be 
assumed to share the spatial attributes of the seen object) could be viewed as 
adequate for perception of the spatially elaborated visual world. However, adherence 
to this optical distinction (between an object and its retinal projection) is not sufficient 
motivation for the postulation of two phenomenally distinct conscious states (the 
sensory core and the visual world). For one thing, it might be maintained that the 
phenomenal character of everyday experience in fact corresponds to the spatial 
features of the retinal projection; this would amount to denial, on phenomenological 
grounds, that there is a visual world distinct from the sensory core. Or some other 
kind of two-stage theory might be maintained, for instance, that the stimulus 
representation (the retinal projection) never enters consciousness, but, say, is pro- 
cessed into the visual world through physiological mechanisms.3 Indeed, a survey of 
the history of the psychology of vision would reveal that theories of vision in which a 
sensory core is postulated are but one species of two-stage theories of vision, and that 
an initial stage in which spatial properties of objects are represented as they are 
projected upon the retina may be postulated without it being supposed that this 
initial stage is consciously accessible. In any event, it can be seen that a second 
precondition of the distinction between the sensory core and visual world is the 
conjunction of the following two beliefs: (1) that a projective representation enters 
consciousness, and (2) that nevertheless we typically do apprehend (in a phenomen- 
ally direct manner) the objective spatial properties of objects.4 
Our paper will focus upon medieval and seventeenth-century theories of vision, 
culminating in the work of Berkeley. Thus, even though the concept of sensory core 
derives its historical significance from its widespread employment during the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries, the historical situation has dictated that we focus 
upon an earlier period, since the concept whose development we wish to understand 
has its foundations in an optical tradition stretching back to Greek antiquity and 
including both Arabic and medieval Latin components. Our investigations have led 
us to believe that the development of this concept resulted from alteration within, 
3These "physiological mechanisms" are to be understood as noncognitive; another possibility, one that 
we shall invoke below, is that the projective pattern is represented and processed cognitively, but that these 
cognitive operations are not even in principle available to consciousness. 
4The importance of these two notions in 18th- and 19th-century visual theory is evident from Pastore, 
Selective History, pp. 11-13 and 178-181. 
This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 365 
rather than the radical overthrow of, the psychology of vision as it had come to be 
conceived in this optical tradition. If our interpretation is correct, it was not a change 
in the theory of the psychology of vision that engendered the idea of a sensory core, 
but rather the introduction of the theory into a new metaphysical context. 
ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL OPTICS AND THEORY OF SPATIAL VISION 
The discovery that the three-dimensional attributes of objects are not represented in 
the sense organ in a direct or simple manner was not trivial. In several types of 
ancient visual theory, no difference was postulated between the spatial properties of 
objects and those of the optical stimulus, because it was believed that the stimulus to 
vision shares the attributes of the seen object. According to the extramissionist 
position, vision proceeds from the eye to the object, and the properties of the object 
are known by direct contact. Galen and some of the Stoics shared the view that 
something is extramitted from the eye into the air, transforming the air into an 
instrument of sensation (standing in relation to the eye as a nerve to the brain) and 
thereby allowing for direct apprehension of the object's spatial properties. For 
intromissionist theories, something proceeds from object to eye and represents the 
object to the sensitive soul. The eidolon of the ancient atomists, a film of atoms 
emitted from the surface of the object, was conceived to convey a three-dimensional 
representation of that surface directly to the sense organ and through the optic nerve 
to the soul.5 According to the theories considered so far, whether the eye reaches out 
to the object itself, or something comes to the eye and stands for the object, the 
spatial attributes of the thing that is sensed are identical to those of the object.6 
The ancient writers just considered were concerned either with explaining the 
physical process of perception (perhaps in the service of epistemology) or with 
providing a description of the optical process for medical purposes. There was a third 
tradition in antiquity, in which geometry was employed in the analysis of vision.7 
This tradition, whose most prominent members were Euclid and Ptolemy, provided a 
geometrical analysis of the field of vision in terms of a visual pyramid formed by rays 
extramitted from the eye to points on seen objects. According to this analysis, 
information about the viewer-relative situation of objects with respect to the horizon- 
tal and vertical dimensions is provided by the ordering of the rays within the visual 
pyramid to the right or left of one another and above or below one another. 
Information about distance is provided by the length of each ray from the eye to the 
object. In other words, to each of the three dimensions of Euclidean space there 
5 For a summary of the theories mentioned in this paragraph, as well as other ancient theories, see David 
C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 
2-11, and the bibliographical references mentioned there. 
6The idea that the eye receives three-dimensional copies of objects has its attractions, and as late as 1823 
C. J. Lehot, in his Nouvelle theorie de la vision (Paris, 1823), put forth the theory that "the points of the 
luminous cones which penetrate the eye form, in the vitreous humor, at a certain distance from the retina, 
images in three-dimensions, and vision is effected by the perception of these images," the vitreous humor 
being the sensitive portion of the eye (Pt. I, pp. 42-43). Conversely, the idea that a mere image might be 
sufficient for the apprehension of the three-dimensional world has obvious difficulties, and in antiquity the 
equivocality of images for size and distance was used as an argument against the view that the proper 
object of vision is an image: Theophrastus, On the Senses, trans. George M. Stratton, in Theophrastus and 
the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (New York: Macmillan; London: Allen & Unwin, 
1917), pp. 97-99 (the image in question was the pupillary image). 
70n the division of ancient optical thought into these three traditions, see Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, 
p. 1. 
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corresponds a dimension of the visual pyramid.8 It follows that if a percipient is to 
receive determinate information concerning the spatial features of a seen object, all 
three of the dimensions of the visual pyramid must be apprehended. Thus the 
objective size of an object is inadequately represented by visual angle; distance, the 
third dimension in the visual pyramid, must also be taken into account.9 A similar 
point may be made about shape. The relative order within the visual pyramid of those 
rays that meet the edges of the object does not bear determinate information about 
the object's shape; information about the lengths of these rays is also required. 10 Here 
then is the sort of optical distinction between elements in the optical pattern (visual 
angle, projective shape) and properties of objects themselves (size, shape) that is 
logically prerequisite to the idea of the sensory core. 
The observation that information about the lengths of the rays is required for the 
discrimination of size and shape is not present in Euclid's Optics. It is, however, 
present in Ptolemy, who went beyond the geometry of the relationship between eye 
and object to concern himself with the actual processes-physical, physiological, and 
psychological-that occur during vision.1" Following Aristotle and others, Ptolemy 
held that light and color are the proper objects of vision and that the mediate objects 
of vision-size, shape, location, motion, and rest-are discriminated through the 
differentiation of light and color.12 Yet as we have seen, mere differentiation within 
the ordering of the rays forming the visual pyramid would not be sufficient for the 
apprehension of size and shape (and the same holds for location and motion). 
Ptolemy was not only aware of this geometrical fact, but he also realized that despite 
the inadequacy of, say, visual angle for size, observers typically do apprehend 
objective size.'3 Hence he recognized not only an optical distinction between objec- 
tive size and visual angle, but also a psychological distinction between the discrimina- 
tion of visual angle and the visual apprehension of size. Moreover, he gave a 
psychological explanation (albeit a very sketchy one) of the process by which distance 
and visual angle are conjoined in size perception. Lejeune has characterized Ptole- 
my's view as follows: "The information furnished by visual angle is not accepted in its 
'raw' form. Long practice has accustomed us to make an appropriate estimate of the 
effects of the distance and obliquity of an object upon its apparent size, and we 
manage to restore the true size of the object."'4 
One might wonder what led Ptolemy to characterize the psychological processes 
involved here as an estimation (existimare), and whether the observer is conscious, or 
at least potentially conscious, of the elements (distance and visual angle) upon which 
8Ptolemy, Optica II 26, ed. A. Lejeune, L'optique de Claude Ptolmme dans la version latine d'apres 
l'arabe de l'emir Eugene de Sicile (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Universite, 1956), p. 25. Euclid, L'optique et 
la catoptrique, trans. P. Ver Eecke (Paris: Albert Blanchard, 1959), pp. 1-2. Euclid does not consider the 
lengths of the visual rays, but only their ordering within the visual pyramid. Cf. A. Lejeune, Euclide et 
Ptolemee, deux stades de l'optique geometrique grecque (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Universite, 1948), pp. 
89-95. 
9Ptolemy, Optica II 63, ed. Lejeune, pp. 45-46; cf. Lejeune, Euclide et PtoMme'e, pp. 95-101. 
?Iobid., 64-73, ed. Lejeune, pp. 46-50; cf. Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolem6e, pp. 103-107. 
"As far as can be determined, Euclid intended his work to present geometrical optics in a way that 
would be of use to scenographers. Lejeune says that the Optics of Euclid is "no more than a treatise on 
perspective. It systematically ignores every physical or psychological aspect of the problem of vision" 
(Euclide et Ptolemee, p. 172, cf. pp. 93-95). E.g., as far as vision was concerned, Euclid identified size with 
visual angle (L'optique, trans. Ver Eecke, Props. 2-8, pp. 2-7). Lejeune stresses Ptolemy's concern for the 
physiological and the psychological as a way in which optics had progressed since Euclid (Euclide et 
Ptolme'e, pp. 172-177). 
12Aristotle, De anima 418a 9-30. Ptolemy, Optica II 6-11, ea. Lejeune, pp. 13-16. 
13Ptolemy, Optica II 52-63, ed. Lejeune, pp. 38-46. 
14Lejeune, Euclide et Ptoleme'e, pp. 96-97. 
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the corrective estimations operate. Lejeune has concluded that Ptolemy "did not 
consider this operation as a judgment fully conscious and distinct from sensation 
itself,"'15 a turn of phrase that brings to mind the unnoticed judgmental processes 
described by latter-day theorists. It would, however, be hasty to identify Ptolemy's 
theory with more recent theory in all its essentials. 
Between the time of Ptolemy and the seventeenth century, the most significant 
contribution to visual theory was that of the Islamic natural philosopher Alhazen (c. 
965-1039). He made the intromissionist theory viable by applying ray geometry to 
the problem of how the eye receives a spatially coherent impression despite the fact 
that each part of the eye is bombarded by entities transmitted from every part of the 
visual field. In addition, Alhazen integrated his theory of geometrical and physiologi- 
cal optics into a detailed account of the physiology and psychology of vision, 
including a thorough treatment of spatial vision.16 Each of these achievements is 
germane to our inquiry. 
Alhazen's establishment of a geometrical basis for the intromission theory de- 
pended upon his argument that the arrangement of points in the field of vision is 
reproduced in the physiological process generated at the crystalline humor (which he, 
in the tradition of Galen and Ptolemy, considered to be the seat of vision) by 
incoming radiation. Essentially he adapted the visual pyramid of Euclid and Ptolemy 
to the intromissionist position. For Alhazen, the pyramid consists of those rays that 
fall at right angles to the surface of the crystalline humor. 17 As in the theory of Euclid 
and Ptolemy, the pyramid has its base on the objects in the field of view and its vertex 
in the eye; unlike the previous theory, the direction of the rays is from object to eye. A 
cross-section of the pyramid is physiologically received by the crystalline humor 
through an act characterized as a "sensing." Of the luminous rays received at the 
surface of the crystalline, only the luminosity and color of each ray-and not the 
arrangement of the rays or the spatial information conveyed by that arrangement-is 
sensed by the eye itself.18 This act of sensing occurs through an alteration produced 
by each luminous ray in the "visual spirit" present in the crystalline humor, whereby 
the visual spirit takes on theform of light and color. 19 The alteration suffered by each 
punctiform area is transmitted, by a "quasi-optical" process involving refraction and 
l5Ibid., p. 99. 
16For an evaluation of Alhazen's role in the development of optical theory, see Lindberg, Al-Kindi to 
Kepler, Ch. 4. On the physiological and psychological aspects of Alhazen's theory, see A. I. Sabra, 
"Sensation and Inference in Alhazen's Theory of Visual Perception," in Studies in Perception, Peter 
Machamer and Robert Turnbull, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978), pp. 160-185. In 
constructing our summary of Alhazen's views we have used these authors as a guide to Alhazen's De 
aspectibus (esp. Bk. I, Secs. 16-19 and Bk. II, Secs. 1-41, ed. Friedrich Risner, Opticae thesaurus Alhazeni 
Arabis libri septem, Basel, 1572, pp. 8-12, 24-57; all subsequent references are to this edition, which has 
been reprinted, New York: Johnson Reprint, 1972). 
17The perpendicular is selected from the sheath of rays converging on a single point of the crystalline by 
a weakening of all but the unrefracted (perpendicular) rays, or by a special receptivity of the crystalline to 
perpendicular rays (Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 75-78; Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Al- 
hazen," pp. 165-166). 
18Alhazen, De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 6, pp. 26-27. Cf. H. Bauer, "Die Psychologie Alhazens," Beitrage 
zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 1911, 10 (5): 29-32, and Sabra, "Sensation and Inference 
in Alhazen," pp. 173-174. Alhazen thus adopted the traditional view that light and color are the proper 
objects of vision (Bk. II, Secs. 17-18, p. 35). 
19Alhazen adopts an Aristotelian view of the reception process; Aristotle had maintained that the sense 
organ accepts the form (in this case color) of the sensible thing without the matter, thereby taking on the 
properties of the sensible thing (cf. Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 8-9 and 78-79). Incidentally, the 
term "visual spirit" refers to a substance that serves as the soul's agent in the eye; it is not a "spiritual" 
(ghostlike) substance (Alhazen attributes density to it), but neither is it the inert matter of Descartes' 
"animal spirits," since it is endowed with sentience. 
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rectilinear transmission, from the crystalline humor through the vitreous humor and 
down the optical medium residing in each of the optic nerves (which were believed to 
be hollow and filled with visual spirit).20 This process is described as the transmission 
of a coherent "form"-bearing point-for-point correspondence to the objects in the 
field of vision-from the surface of the crystalline through the eye and optic nerve. In 
the optic chiasma the separate transmissions from each eye join to form a single 
impression, and this unified punctiform representation of the field of vision is 
received by the ultimum sentiens, the faculty of sense that completes the act of 
vision.21 
The ultimum sentiens avails itself of the spatial information present in the cross- 
section of the visual pyramid in order to apprehend the objects of vision other than 
light and color (Alhazen listed twenty such objects in all, including spatial properties 
such as size, shape, solidity, and motion).22 However, as the geometry dictates, the 
arrangement of points within the cross-section provides direct information about 
only two dimensions: the third dimension, depth or distance, is lacking.23 In fact, 
Alhazen embraced the intromissionist counterpart of Ptolemy's geometrical observa- 
tion that elements of the visual pyramid such as projective shape are indeterminate 
for objective properties such as shape. He was aware that a circle oblique to the line 
of sight would produce an elliptical pattern at the surface of the crystalline, and that 
visual angle does not specify the objective size of an object (distance, too, must be 
taken into account). Furthermore, and of greater interest for our story, Alhazen saw 
that an account was needed of the phenomenological fact that we typically apprehend 
circles as circles, even though they are oblique to the line of sight, and that we 
typically are able to discriminate the sizes of objects, even though this discrimination 
requires taking distance into account.24 His viewpoint thus included the two notions 
which historically have been associated with the concept of sensory core, that spatial 
properties as received at the eye (e.g., an ellipse) differ from objective properties (e.g., 
a rotated circle), and that we nonetheless apprehend the latter. In essence, we may say 
that Alhazen realized that a mere understanding of the geometry of visual stimulation 
is not sufficient to explain the perceptual achievements of the human percipient: 
20The transmission within each eye proceeds rectilinearly, with one refraction at the posterior edge of the 
crystalline; this refraction, which is toward the normal (and hence away from the optic axis), serves both to 
keep the rays from crossing (which would produce an inverted ordering) and to direct the rays toward the 
opening of the optic nerve (which was thought to be centered at the rear of the eye, along the axis of 
vision). Because of the special efficacy of the visual spirit, within the optic nerve the transmitted entity 
follows the path of the nerve without its ordering being affected. Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 69-85, 
provides a thorough treatment of the physiology of this process; cf. Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in 
Alhazen," pp. 166-168. Figure 1 (below) illustrates the path of transmission according to a follower of 
Alhazen. 
21Alhazen, De aspectibus, Bk. II, Secs. 1-6, pp. 24-27. The reception of the forms of light and color by 
the opaque body of the ultimum sentiens in the optic chiasma occurs by an "illumination" and "coloring" 
of this body (Sec. 6, p. 27). 
22Ibid., Sec. 15, p. 34. Additional objects of vision, or "intentiones visibiles," include number, similarity, 
and beauty. 
23Ibid., Sec. 24, p. 39: "Remotio rei visae non comprehenditur per se." Especially telling is Alhazen's 
treatment of the perception of solidity (or corporeity), in which he says that vision immediately apprehends 
the longitude and latitude of bodies opposite the eye, but not the third dimension: "visus . .. comprehendet 
statim extensionem illius corporis secundum longitudem & latitudem, & non remanet nisi dimensio tertia" 
(Sec. 31, p. 47). Cf. Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, pp. 55-56. 
24Alhazen clearly states that any pair of diameters on a circle are seen as equal even when the circle is 
oblique to the line of sight (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 36, p. 51). With respect to size, he says "virtus 
distinctiva distinguet quantitatem rei visae, non considerabit angulum tantum, sed considerabit angulum 
& remotionem simul" (Sec. 38, p. 51; on the virtus distinctiva, see below). 
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psychological processes must also be invoked. While this realization was also implicit 
in Ptolemy, Alhazen went further in developing an account of these psychological 
processes. 
Since, on Alhazen's account, only a two-dimensional arrangement of luminous 
points is represented in the cross-section of the pyramid transmitted to the ultimum 
sentiens, the apprehension of objects in three dimensions must involve more than the 
mere passive reception of the stimulation carried by the optic nerves. The activity by 
which the ultimum sentiens goes beyond the stimulation it receives consists of 
"reasoning" and "distinguishing" (rationem and distinctionem); these judgmental 
activities are performed by the virtus distinctiva.25 Alhazen offered an extended 
treatment of the psychology of visual judgments, but it will suffice here to observe 
that in cases where the judgments are performed over and over again, the faculty of 
judgment need not go through the entire process of judging (by "iteration of argu- 
ments") each time it is confronted with a particular set of sensory data; rather it 
comes to perform these judgments through recognition (cognitionem) of significant 
features, or signs (signa), that lead it to assign a particular set of properties to the 
objects seen. Judgment by recognition takes place so quickly that we do not perceive 
that we judge.26 It is in this way that distance, size, and shape are perceived. Distance 
is apprehended through a judgment of the number of regular-sized intervals compos- 
ing the continuous ground space between the observer and the distal object, or, since 
the process occurs frequently, through a judgment by recognition.27 From the 
distance to an object together with visual angle, the size of the object can be 
apprehended, again through judgment by recognition.28 Similarly, apprehension of 
the distance to various points in the field of vision can be used to apprehend the 
solidity and shape of seen objects.29 Thus, in general, according to Alhazen the visual 
apprehension of the spatial properties of the visual world is made possible by an 
unnoticed process of judgment. 
The essentials of Alhazen's theory of vision are, in fundamental ways, parallel to 
those of the standard theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. First, 
pertaining to the effective stimulus for vision: while the two-dimensional array of 
light and color transmitted to the ultimum sentiens is not an optical image (such as 
the real image formed by a lens or the virtual image of mirror vision), the geometrical 
qualities it shares with the retinal image are striking (e.g., point-for-point correspon- 
dence with luminous points in the field of vision and ambivalence with respect to 
actual size). One might choose to characterize the physiology of vision according to 
Alhazen as the transmission of an "image" or "picture" of the objects in the field of 
vision through the optic nerve to the brain. Such a characterization would serve to 
emphasize that the immediate object of vision according to Alhazen shares the 
essential properties of what was taken to be the immediate object of vision by Kepler: 
25Ibid., Sec. 10, pp. 30-31. 
26Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen," pp. 171-179, gives a thorough account of Alhazen's 
statements on perceptual judgment in general (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Secs. 10-12, pp. 30-32), but does not 
deal with particular cases such as distance, size, or shape. Our discussion of these cases is of course not 
exhaustive, and a thorough treatment of Alhazen's psychology of vision is much needed. 
27Alhazen's discussion of the apprehension of distance is long and complex (involving a distinction 
between the apprehension of mere outness as opposed to location, Bk. II, Secs. 23-24, pp. 38-39); we have 
focused upon the apprehension of the amount of distance for moderate distances, in which case distance is 
apprehended "per cognitionem" (Sec. 25, pp. 39-42; Secs. 39-40, pp. 53-56). 
28Ibid., Sec. 38, pp. 51-53. 
29Ibid., Secs. 31, 36, pp. 47-48, 50-51. 
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an arrangement of points of light and color reproducing the two-dimensional ar- 
rangement of points in the field of vision.30 
But it is with respect to his thoughts about the psychological processes that occur 
during spatial vision that Alhazen's theory exhibits the most striking resemblance to 
later theory: distance is not immediately perceived (i.e., is not perceived by sense 
alone) but is apprehended by means of a judgmental act; size is apprehended by 
means of a judgment that takes distance into account; a circle oblique to the line of 
sight is perceived to be a circle through a judgment concerning the distance to various 
parts of the circle. And so it is not surprising that Bauer, in his 1911 study of 
Alhazen's psychology, remarked that in the field of spatial perception Alhazen 
"touched upon a series of the most important psychological problems, and his 
explanations anticipate in a surprising manner thoughts that were again taken up 
only in the most recent development of psychology."31 Bauer drew particular atten- 
tion to what he characterized as Alhazen's theory of "unconscious inference,"32 a 
term that immediately calls to mind Helmholtz's nineteenth-century version of the 
psychology of unnoticed judgments. Is it true then that all of the central elements of 
later psychology of vision were present in Alhazen (or perhaps even Ptolemy)? 
The one element not clearly present is the sensory core, where the referent of this 
term is taken to be a consciously accessible representation of the field of vision in two 
dimensions. The difficulty in deciding whether Alhazen (or Ptolemy)33 employed the 
concept of sensory core lies deeper than a simple failure of these authors to state 
clearly an opinion on the matter. To ask whether sensory stimulation is, at a 
particular point in the process of vision that begins with the reception of light at the 
eye and ends with an experience of the visual world, experienceable or not, is to ask a 
question that makes sense only within certain intellectual frameworks. Among many 
authors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to ask this question would have 
been to ask whether something was an idea, since ideas were the only legitimate 
objects of awareness. It is not clear what the medieval equivalent to this question 
would have been. This lack of clarity probably results from the fact that in the 
psychology of the Middle Ages (at least as manifested in the optical tradition) there 
was no clear distinction between the physiological and the mental. As Bauer has 
remarked, for Alhazen and other Arabic as well as Latin authors (who were following 
Aristotle in this regard), the mental was not limited to the conscious.34 Thus if we ask 
whether the "sensing" of light and color by the eye and the "judging" of the pattern of 
stimulation by the virtus distinctiva are physiological or mental events (where these 
terms are restricted to something close to their modern significations), the answer 
comes out as a confused "both," or perhaps "neither." They are like mental events 
insofar as they are described in the mentalistic language of sensing and judging.35 Yet 
30Lindberg has especially emphasized the degree to which Kepler's optical work remained within an 
intellectual framework provided by Alhazen (Al-Kindi to Kepler, p. 86). Incidentally, a second feature of 
standard post-Keplerian theory is found in Alhazen: the independent transmission of points of stimulation 
from the receptive surface of the eye into the brain, which is a key feature of the so-called "constancy 
hypothesis" (on the importance of this hypothesis in the history of perceptual theory, see Pastore, Selective 
History, pp. 11-12 and passim). 
31 Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, p. 54. 
32Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
33See Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolemee, p. 99, for the ambiguities in Ptolemy on this point. 
34Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, p. 11. 
35Alhazen remarks that the rational processes by which the act of vision is completed are of the same 
type as other rational processes, but that we are able to ascertain this only through a second reasoning 
process, which is a reasoning about the reasoning that occurs during vision (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 13, 
pp. 32-33). But Alhazen's view that the rational processes in vision are properly cognitive processes is, of 
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they are like physiological events in that they take place at early or middle stages in 
the chain of physio-psychological processes that proceed from the eye toward the 
central cavities of the brain. Our intuition that events characterized as mental 
(described in mentalistic language) should be accessible to consciousness is not 
fulfilled. One is led to believe that the attempt to apply the modern categories 
"physiological" and "mental" to medieval visual theory is misguided. 
In sum, the explanation of spatial vision provided by Alhazen (and, to a lesser 
extent, Ptolemy) contained the central features of the standard eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century explanation. Included in Alhazen's theory was an optical distinc- 
tion between objective spatial properties and spatial properties as received at the 
sense organ, as well as a physio-psychological distinction between spatial properties 
as represented in the sensory processes transmitted from the eye to the brain and 
spatial properties as apprehended in experience. If, despite the parallels between his 
explanation of vision and that of later thinkers, Alhazen did not employ the concept 
of sensory core, the reason is to be found in his conception of mind, rather than in 
factors internal to his theory of vision. 
VISUAL THEORY AFTER ALHAZEN 
Alhazen's major work on vision was available in translation to the Latin West by the 
early thirteenth century; his theory and its derivatives dominated optical science until 
the time of Kepler. A rapid survey of the relevant texts has suggested that with 
respect to the psychology of vision, Alhazen's chief followers in the West-Bacon, 
Pecham, and Witelo-were in fundamental agreement with the master: "no visible 
intention except light and color is perceived by sense alone";36 distance from the 
observer to the visual object "is not perceived by sight, but is determined by reason- 
ing";37 indeed, all of the objects of vision except light and color "are apprehended not 
by sense alone but by the cooperation of argumentation and the discriminative 
faculty, intermingled almost imperceptibly."38 As is illustrated by Figure 1, taken 
from Witelo but representative of Pecham and Bacon (and Alhazen as well), there 
was similar agreement on matters of ray geometry and the physiological process of 
transmission: vision takes place by a pyramid of rays reaching the eye (those rays 
received perpendicularly at the surface of the crystalline, which are represented in the 
diagram by the lines proceeding from gbc, the visual object, to each eye); a cross- 
section of this pyramid, the points of which stand in a one-to-one correspondence to 
points in the field of vision, is directed into the optic nerve by refraction of the rays 
travelling through the eye; and the impressions received by the two eyes are reduced 
to unity by being brought together in the nervous system (at kad).39 
course, not evidence that he believed the premises of those operations (the transmitted "form") were ever 
phenomenally accessible. 
36John Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics: Perspectiva communis, ed. and trans. David C. 
Lindberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), Bk. I, Sec. 61, p. 139. 
37Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 63, p. 141; cf. Roger Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Pt. 2, Dist. 3, Ch. 3, trans. Robert 
Burke (N.Y.: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 523, and Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. IV, Sec. 9 (ed. Risner, 
Opticae thesaurus), p. 121. 
38Pecham, Perspectiva communis, Bk. I, Sec. 56, p. 137; cf. Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Sec. I, Dist. 10, 
Ch. 3, and Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. III, Secs. 60 and 63, pp. 111-113. 
39Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Pt. 1, Dists. 5 and 6, Ch. 2, pp. 449-453, 456-458; Pecham, Perspectiva 
communis, Bk. I, Secs. 32-38, pp. 117-123; Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. III, Secs. 17-20, 37, pp. 92-94, 
102-103. The diagram is from Witelo, ibid., p. 103, where it is introduced in a discussion of binocular 
single vision. It is clear from the text on p. 102 that lines gu and cx should be directed toward the center of 
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Remarkable as it may seem, there was nearly complete agreement on the principles 
underlying Alhazen's theory of vision among post-Keplerian visual theorists, includ- 
ing Kepler himself. Of special interest to us 
is the continuation of Alhazen's treatment . c 
of the psychology of vision, which we will 
examine presently. But the principles of 
Alhazen's optical analysis were also contin- 
ued. This is not to say that Kepler and his 
followers believed the crystalline humor to 
be the seat of vision-all of the writers we 
will discuss accepted Kepler's view that 
vision takes place by means of the retinal 
image. It is rather that in terms of the / /f s f & 
analysis of the effective stimulus for vision, 
it makes little difference if the seat of one- \ \i 
to-one correspondence is moved from the \ _ nt 
crystalline humor to the retina. Assuredly, u 
the retinal image is inverted and is a true 
optical image, but these facts do not change 
the principle of one-to-one correspondence. 
Viewed in terms of the overall process of 
vision, the Keplerian lens system simply 
functions to establish a one-to-one corre- 
spondence in a fashion different from Al- 
hazen's selective reception of rays perpen- / 
dicular to the crystalline.40 Moreover, 
the essential features of Euclid's and 
Ptolemy's geometrical analysis of the field 
of vision were applicable in post-Keplerian / 
dioptrics. Particularly, the relationship be- 
tween objective size and shape and optically 
received size and shape remained the same: / 
the static retinal projection is indeterminate 
for the objective properties. g C 
The discovery of the retinal image did _ 
necessitate a change in the conception of 
the physiological transmission of stimula- Figure 1. The visual system according to 
tion from the eye to the brain. The notion Witelo. The visual object is represented by noi gbc; the optic nerves are represented 
that the stimulus to vision is an image schematically by hrf-kad and Ise-kad, and 
formed across the posterior hemisphere of kad is the ultimum sentiens. 
the eyeball is incompatible with the "quasi-optical" transmission of a cross-section of 
the visual pyramid directly into and through the optic nerve. Yet, as we shall see, the 
the eye o, and gy and cz should be directed toward the center of the eyep, in which case the lines would be 
received perpendicular to the surfaces unx and yqz. This inaccuracy also occurs in a 14th-century 
manuscript version of the drawing, reproduced in A. C. Crombie, "The Mechanistic Hypothesis and the 
Scientific Study of Vision: Some Optical Ideas as a Background to the Invention of the Microscope," in 
Historical Aspects of Microscopy, S. Bradbury and G. L'E. Turner, eds. (Cambridge: Royal Microscopical 
Society, 1967), pp. 3-112, Fig. 10. 
40Kepler and later writers explicitly treated the lens system as a means of establishing a one-to-one 
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arrangements proposed by Kepler and his successors to effect his transmission did 
not deviate from the spirit of Alhazen's theory. Despite major alterations in the 
conception of the transmission process itself, the same characterization of post- 
ocular transmission as we have applied to Alhazen-the transmission of a "picture" 
or "image" through the optic nerve-remained applicable for at least two centuries 
after Kepler.41 
Two views of post-retinal transmission are discernible in the seventeenth century. 
The first stems from Kepler himself. What Kepler did was to provide an interpreta- 
tion of the transmission process that was consistent with his new understanding of the 
eye's structure and function but that remained within the ontological framework of 
the traditional physiology of nervous transmission. In both Kepler's account and the 
accounts of Alhazen and others, the key role in the reception of light and color and 
the transmission of the received impressions to the seat of visual judgment is played 
by "visual spirit."42 Whereas for Alhazen the transmission could be seen as a direct 
extension of the received rays of light into and through the optic nerve, to Kepler it 
was clear that anything resembling an optical transmission had to end at the opaque 
surface of the retina. Kepler denied that visual spirit was an "optical body," but 
retained the view that the image or picture received at the eye is transmitted by means 
of the visual spirit to the seat of visual judgment, or, as he termed it (in Aristotelian 
fashion), the "common sense."43 He described the transmitted entity as an "immate- 
rial image" (spiciem immateriatam).44 Both the affection (passio) of the visual spirit 
by light and color and the transmission of the immaterial image were considered by 
Kepler to be "occult" or "obscure" processes, belonging to "the realm of the wonder- 
ful."45 The image itself was thought to be produced by and to correspond to the 
retinal image, and so to bear a point-for-point correspondence with the objects before 
the eye. Vision was pretty much equated with the immaterial image. Insofar as this 
was the case, there was no room in Kepler's views for the concept of a sensory core 
distinct from the visual world, since there was no basis for the distinction itself. The 
correspondence between points in the field of vision and points on the surface of the retina: Kepler, Ad 
vitellionem paralipomena (1604), in his Gesammelte Werke (Munich: Beck, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 153-156, 
trans. A. C. Crombie, in Melanges Alexandre Koyre (Paris: Hermann, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 150-157; 
Descartes, Dioptrique, in Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 
1969-1975) (this edition of Descartes' works will be referred to as AT), Vol. VI, p. 109, trans. P. Olscamp, 
in Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 
91-95. 
41Robert Smith's A Compleat System of Opticks (London, 1738) provides a brief but representative 
statement of the 18th-century view of post-retinal physiology: speaking of the "pictures" painted upon the 
retina, Smith says "these pictures propagated by motion along the fibres of the optick nerves into the brain 
are the cause of vision" (p. 27). 
42Kepler, Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, trans. Crombie, pp. 148-150; Dioptrice (1611, reprint, 
Cambridge: Heffner, 1962), Prop. 61, pp. 23-25, trans. F. Plehn, Dioptrik, Ostwald's Klassiker der 
exakten Wissenschaften, No. 144 (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 28-30. Kepler shared the earlier view (n. 19 above) 
that visual spirit is the agent of the soul. 
43Kepler's denial that visual spirit is an optical body came in Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, 
trans. Crombie, pp. 148-149, a work in which he did not take a firm stand on post-retinal transmission (cf. 
Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 203-204); in the later Dioptrice he clearly stated that an image is 
transmitted to the common sense, but he equivocated on the role of the optic nerve in this transmission, 
Prop. 61, pp. 23-24, trans. Plehn, pp. 29-30. 
44Dioptrice, p. 24, trans. Plehn, p. 29. 
45Ibid., and Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, pp. 152-153, trans. Crombie, pp. 148, 150. While Kepler 
maintained that the process of transmission is beyond the scope of the laws of optics, he countered that 
since "optics" derives its name from "vision," it is "wrong to exclude it [the transmission process] from the 
science of Optics simply because, in the present limited state of our science, it cannot be accommodated in 
Optics" (Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, Crombie, p. 148). 
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Figure 2. The visual system according to Descartes. 
visual world was equated with a mental correlate of the retinal image.46 
The second view of post-retinal physiology discernible in the seventeenth century 
stems from Descartes. It differs from the first view and from the position of Alhazen 
and his Latin followers, not in its conception of the psychologically effective features 
of the transmitted stimulus, but in the ontology of the physiological process. Des- 
cartes' physiological ideas often involve "adaptive modifications" of earlier ideas, and 
his views on the physiology of vision are no exception.47 Indeed, his treatment of 
post-retinal physiology is essentially a recasting of the view shared by Alhazen and 
others into his new ontology, with its strict division between mechanistically con- 
ceived physiological processes in the nervous system and sensations in the soul. For 
the quasi-optical transmission of the forms of light and color through the efficacy of 
the visual spirit, or the transmission of an immaterial image through the special 
power of a mysterious spiritual agent, Descartes substituted the mechanical trans- 
mission of a "material image" to the seat of visual judgment. As illustrated in Figure 
2, the transmission from the two eyes results in the formation, on the surface of the 
pineal gland (H), of a single "image" or "picture" composed of a pattern of motions 
(abc) that bear a one-to-one correspondence to the motions comprising the retinal 
image (1-3-5), and hence to points on the visible object (ABC).48 Comparison of 
Figure 2 with Figure 1 reveals that although there are differences-primarily with 
respect to the anatomical destination of the transmitted entity (in the pineal gland as 
opposed to the optic chiasma) and the operations of the eye upon incoming rays of 
46Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 153, trans. Crombie, p. 150. Cf. E. G. Boring, Sensation and 
Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942), p. 
223. 
470n Descartes' "adaptive modifications" see Thomas S. Hall's commentary to his translation of 
Descartes' Treatise of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), nn. 85 and 40, and pp. 
xxxi-xxxlll. 
48Descartes describes the transmission process in the Treatise of Man, trans. Hall, pp. 83-86; cf. 
Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, p. 137, trans. Olscamp, p. 100. The drawing is from the posthumous French 
edition of Descartes' L'homme (Paris, 1664, reprint in Hall), p. 71; it was not done under the supervision of 
Descartes but was produced by La Forge at the time of the posthumous edition, under contract from the 
editor, Clerselier (Hall, p. xxxv). There is no mention in the text of the "reinversion" of the pineal image as 
suggested by the drawing; cf. N. Pastore and H. Klibbe, "The Orientation of the Cerebral Image in 
Descartes' Theory of Visual Perception," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1969, 
5:385-389. 
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light (formation of a retinal image through the refractive power of the lens, versus the 
singling out of perpendicular rays)-the principle underlying the two views of post- 
ocular transmission is the same: the nervous system transmits the ordered array of 
stimulation received at the two eyes to the brain and combines the two transmitted 
impressions into one. Yet for Descartes the transmitted entity, just as the light 
proceeding from objects to the eye, is in the material realm; it has nothing of the 
character of sensation. The mind senses, rather than the eye.49 At the pineal gland 
body and mind are "united," so that motions in the material nervous system produce 
sensations in the mind. 
These sensations serve for the apprehension of the qualities known by vision. In his 
Dioptrique (1637) Descartes listed six principal qualities: light and color, which alone 
are proper to vision, and four spatial qualities, location, distance, size, and shape.50 
Descartes made clear that these qualities are not apprehended by direct inspection of 
the pineal image, as if we had other eyes in our brain with which to gaze at this 
physiological "picture." The pineal image causes sensations only insofar as it acts 
upon the mind; the movements that constitute this picture, "acting immediately on 
our mind inasmuch as it is united to our body, are so established by Nature to make it 
have certain sensations."'51 He explained the sensing of light and color according to 
the principle of psychophysical correspondence: the nature of our mind is such that 
the "force" and "character" of the movements that affect the soul in the brain cause us 
to have sensations of light and color.52 Similarly, through an "institution of Nature," 
sensations of location and distance are produced directly in the soul by the arrange- 
ment and character of motions in the brain.53 
In the case of the perception of size and shape, Descartes did not rely entirely upon 
the principle of psychophysical correspondence, but rather invoked psychological 
processes of the sort described by Alhazen and his followers. He was aware that size 
and shape are not directly determined by visual angle and retinally projected shape. 
Rather, we must estimate or judge them: the size of objects "is estimated according to 
the knowledge, or the opinion, that we have of their distance, compared with the size 
49Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 117-121, Olscamp, p. 87. 
5OIbid., p. 138, Olscamp, p. 101. 
51Ibid. In applying the term "causes" to the relationship between the pineal image and the mind we do 
not mean to preclude the possibility of an occasionalistic interpretation of this relationship; indeed, there is 
strong evidence that Descartes was implicitly committed to an occasionalist metaphysics for both mind- 
body and exclusively material interations, on which see Gary C. Hatfield, "Force (God) in Descartes' 
Physics," forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, esp. n. 87, and the literature 
mentioned there. 
52Ibid. Descartes points out that in order for us to have sensations, there need be no resemblance 
between the physiological event (motions in the brain) and the mental event (the sensation of light and 
color). He thus rejected the traditional physiology, derived from Aristotle, in which the form of the light 
and color is received by the visual spirit through a process which is an illumination and a coloring (see n. 21 
above). In place of this view in which the sensitive soul takes on (comes to "resemble") the properties of the 
object, Descartes substituted his "no resemblance" theory of sensory physiology and psychophysical 
correspondence, on which see Willem van Hoorn, As Images Unwind: Ancient and Modern Theories of 
Visual Perception (Amsterdam: University Press, 1972), pp. 164-167, and Pastore, Selective History, p. 
21. 
53Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 134-137, Olscamp, pp. 104-105; Treatise of Man, trans. Hall, 
pp. 94-100. Position is apprehended because the motions in the brain are uniquely determined with respect 
to both the position of the eyes within the head and the position of a luminous point upon the retina (by 
means of the latter we know that the object is situated at some point along the line of sight drawn from that 
retinal location). Furthermore, distance can be known through the effect upon the mind of brain states 
that mediate the accommodation and convergence of the eyes (in the case of accommodation, Descartes 
built upon the one important difference between pre- and post-Keplerian dioptrics, the necessity to provide 
an accommodative mechanism for changing the focal length of the eye; the potential use of convergence as 
a gauge of distance could, in principle, have been a part of pre-Keplerian psychology of vision). 
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of the image they imprint in the fund of the eye," and "shape is judged by the 
knowledge, or opinion, that we have of the position of various parts of the objects, 
and not by the resemblance of the pictures in the eye; for these pictures usually 
contain only ovals and diamond shapes, yet they cause us to see circles and 
squares."'54 In the Dioptrique Descartes did not provide a thorough analysis of these 
estimations and judgments. In particular, he did not reveal how the mind is able to 
base its judgments of the size of objects upon "the size of the image they imprint in 
the fund of the eye," even though the mind has no direct access to the retinal image. 
An answer that suggests itself on principle is that when Descartes spoke of the mind's 
judgments being based upon retinally projected size, he meant retinally projected size 
as it is represented in a mental correlate of the pineal image, since events at the eye 
affect the mind only by virtue of the intervening nervous transmission to the pineal 
gland, and then only insofar as the pineal events themselves cause the mind to have 
sensations. 
Descartes' view that only a mental correlate of the pineal image is truly sensed 
found clear expression in a passage from the Objections and Replies (1641). In this 
passage Descartes distinguished among three grades of sense activity: (1) "the imme- 
diate affection of the bodily organ by external objects," which in the case of vision 
includes retinal stimulation and transmission to the surface of the pineal; (2) "the 
immediate mental result, due to the mind's union with the corporeal organ affected" 
(i.e., the pineal); and (3) "all those judgments which, on the occasion of motions 
occurring in the corporeal organ, we have from our earliest years been accustomed to 
pass about things external to US."55 Using the example of the perception of a staff, he 
clarified the relationship among the three grades: 
But from this [the first grade of sensation] the second grade of sensation results; and that 
merely extends to the perception of the colour or light reflected from the stick, and is due 
to the fact that the mind is so intimately conjoined with the brain as to be affected by the 
motions arising in it. Nothing more than this should be assigned to sense, if we wish to 
distinguish it accurately from the intellect. For though my judgment that there is a staff 
situated without me, which judgment results from the sensation of colour by which I am 
affected, and likewise my reasoning from the extension of that colour, its boundaries, and 
its position relatively to the parts of my brain, to the size, the shape, and the distance of 
the said staff, are vulgarly assigned to sense, and are consequently here referred to the 
third grade of sensation, they clearly depend upon the understanding alone.56 
The first grade of "sensation" comprises only the motions in the nervous system and 
so is not a true mental sensing. The second grade-the immediate mental result of 
nervous motion-is what properly belongs to sense. The mind cannot base its 
judgment of size directly upon the relative size of the retinal image (since this image is 
part of the first grade of sense), but rather judges from the extension and boundaries 
of the color patch present in sensation. 
The distinction between the first and second grades of sense spans the boundary 
between body and mind. The distinction between the second and third grades is, 
interestingly, a distinction between types of mental events that occur during vision. 
The first term of the distinction-the second grade-is, however, unfamiliar to the 
ordinary observer, who takes the judgments of the third grade to be primary. Even 
54Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 140-141, Olscamp, p. 107. 
"5Descartes, Objections and Replies, AT, Vol. VII, pp. 436-437, trans. E. Haldane and G. Ross, 
Philosophical Works of Descartes (N.Y.: Dover, 1955) (referred to hereafter as HR), Vol. II, p. 251. 
56AT, Vol. VII, pp. 437-438, HR, Vol. II, p. 252. 
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though these judgments "depend upon the understanding alone" and therefore fall 
outside the category of sense, they are "vulgarly" considered to be sensations. This 
confusion- results from the fact that phenomenally speaking we experience objects as 
being of a particular size and at a certain distance and are not aware that our 
ostensibly direct apprehension of objective size and distance is actually mediated by 
the second grade of sense and the judgments performed upon it. Descartes says that 
the reason we confusedly assign these judgments to sense "is just that in these matters 
custom makes us judge so quickly, or rather we recall the judgments previously made 
about similar things; and thus we fail to distinguish the difference between these 
operations and a simple sense perception."57 Our experience of objects in space is 
determined by the outcome of judgmental processes. In spite of, or because of, our 
experiencing the outcome, we fail to notice the judgmental process itself, presumably 
including that upon which the judgment is based (spatial properties as represented in 
the second grade of sense). Thus, in the tradition of Alhazen and his followers, 
Descartes held that the judgments (or recollections of previous judgments) underly- 
ing spatial vision occur so quickly that we fail to notice that we in fact do judge. 
There is a crucial difference between Descartes' treatment of these unnoticed 
perceptual judgments and that of previous writers. We have seen that for Alhazen it 
was difficult to decide-and most likely not appropriate to ask-whether the sensory 
impressions upon which judgments are made are in principle available to conscious- 
ness. With Descartes there is no doubt. The second grade of sensation is an event in 
the soul, an idea, and by virtue of this fact alone must be available to consciousness. 
Descartes identified the mental with the conscious; he contended that we can have no 
ideas of which we are not aware.58 If percipients typically are not aware of the second 
grade of sensation, this fact is to be explained away by recourse to the habitual and 
rapid nature of the judgments. But the second grade remains in principle experience- 
able. 
It should now be apparent that Descartes' distinction between the second and third 
grades of sense corresponds to the distinction between the sensory core and the visual 
world. The second grade of sensation is a mental representation of the retinal image; 
the third grade is the ostensibly direct experience of solid objects at a distance, which 
actually results from unnoticed judgmental processes performed upon the unnoticed 
sensory core. 
One might wonder what prompted Descartes to assert the existence of a mental 
representation of the retinal image and thereby to commit himself to a species of 
visual ideas that are distinct from ordinary visual experience and yet unfamiliar to the 
typical observer. Descartes' inclusion of the second grade of sensation in his analysis 
of vision does not seem to have resulted from an experiment in phenomenology. 
Nowhere does he claim to have experienced the second grade of sensation; we have 
seen that he was forced to explain why we typically do not experience it. Thus it 
seems unlikely that Descartes' postulation of a sensory core was the product of new 
introspective techniques;59 more likely, it was a hypothetical construction based upon 
57Ibid. The statement that we "recall the judgments previously made about similar things" is reminiscent 
of Alhazen's process of judgment through recognition. 
58Replies, HR, Vol. II, p. 115: "there can exist in us no thought of which, at the very moment that it is 
present in us, we are not conscious." Cf. Meditations, HR, Vol. I, p. 169. Descartes used the word 
"thought" to signify "everything that exists in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it. 
Thus all the operations of will, intellect, imagination, and of the senses are thoughts" (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 52). 
59We are not implying that phenomenological considerations never entered Descartes' thought on 
perception; indeed, his observation that objects appear of constant size at different distances (see above) is 
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Descartes' knowledge of the properties of the retinal image and his belief that the 
topological properties of that image are retained while being transmitted physiologi- 
cally to the pineal gland where they become represented in sensation. 
The belief that a mental correlate of the retinal image is available to consciousness 
was never central to Descartes' treatment of vision, and its introduction may be seen 
as a byproduct of his separation of the physiological from the mental. This separa- 
tion restricted the domain of the mental to events occurring in a substance that is 
divorced from processes in the eye or neural pathways (except at the pineal); together 
with the view that every state of this mental substance is a conscious state, it led to the 
implication that every truly sensory state is conscious. So the second grade of 
sensation, as a true sensory state, must be available to consciousness. However, the 
postulation of a sensory core distinct from the visual world was in no way a necessary 
byproduct of these factors. In principle, Descartes could have extended the principle 
of psychophysical correspondence to include all of our spatial ideas; that is, he could 
have imagined a mechanism by which the brain states bearing information about, say, 
distance and visual angle, interact with one another and with the mind to produce a 
sensation directly representing objective size. One could proffer a number of specula- 
tions about why Descartes did not do so, though it is enough here to remark that the 
distinction between the second and third grades of sensation was not merely, or 
perhaps even primarily, intended to capture a purely psychological distinction 
between two stages in the process of spatial vision; it also served epistemology in that 
it distinguished between passively produced sensations which are not susceptible to 
error and actively produced judgments, which are. Thus the distinction allowed 
Descartes to assign the error in spatial illusions to the fallibility of the judging 
intellect, a move that would have been more difficult on a purely psychophysical 
account of spatial vision.60 
In any event, although the distinction between the second and third grades of 
sensation was not necessitated by Descartes' new ontology, the properties of the 
second grade of sensation may nonetheless be understood in terms of Descartes' 
assimilation of the traditional account of spatial vision to that new ontology.61 The 
traditional view (of Alhazen and others) had it that during vision, unnoticed judg- 
ments are performed upon a sensory impression that represents the spatial properties 
of objects according to the projective geometry of optical stimulation. Descartes 
accepted both the traditional view of the geometry of the visual stimulus and the view 
explicitly phenomenological. However, it is an observation regarding the third grade of sensation. We have 
found no instances of his speaking of direct phenomenal access to the second grade; when he wished to 
illustrate its properties, he used perspective drawings as an example (Treatise of Man, Hall, p. 68; 
Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 113, 147), an example which clearly depends upon the geometrical relation- 
ship (as specified by theory) between the retinal image and a perspective projection, rather than upon 
phenomenal considerations. 
60The passages quoted above regarding the three grades of sensation arose in the context of considering 
the question of perceptual error, which Descartes assigned to the implicit judgments of the third grade of 
sensation (HR, Vol. II, pp. 252-253). On a purely psychophysical account, spatial perception would result 
from the lawful interaction of matter with matter and of matter with mind (the first and second grades of 
sensation, in which no falsity can reside, p. 252). 
61 It is not known whether Descartes was directly familiar with Alhazen's optical work. He was, however, 
familiar with Witelo (and hence with Witelo's version of Alhazen's theory), whom he mentioned several 
times (under the name "Vitellion": AT, Vol. I, p. 239; Vol. II, p. 142; Vol. III, p. 483), and from whom he 
apparently copied a table of refractions (Vol. X, p. 8). It is likely that he was familiar with one of the 
Nuremberg editions of Witelo, and not Risner (Vol. I, p. 241). Descartes also knew of Roger Bacon's 
optical work (Vol. II, p. 447). 
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that judgments serve to combine elements (such as visual angle and distance) that are 
represented separately in the optical array. His new ontology demanded that once the 
point-for-point transmission of the visual stimulus has its effect upon the mind (as it 
must if it is to serve as a basis for judgment), the resulting state is undeniably mental 
and therefore necessarily available to consciousness. And this state must in principle 
be available to consciousness even if Descartes did not draw attention to this fact. 
Such are the unexpected consequences that occur when explanatory schema cross the 
boundary from one ontology to another. 
BERKELEY'S NEW THEORY 
While there were adherents of the concept of sensory core62 between the time of 
Descartes and the publication of Berkeley's Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision 
(1709), Berkeley's work provided the first significant elaboration of the psychology of 
vision after Descartes' Dioptrique and was the primary vehicle by means of which the 
sensory core became a standard feature of visual theory for the next two centuries. 
Unlike the theories of the previous writers with whom we have been concerned, 
Berkeley's treatment of vision, where it was not epistemological or metaphysical, was 
psychological: it was primarily concerned with the associative connections among the 
ideas that comprise the immediate and mediate objects of vision.63 The keystone of 
Berkeley's analysis of the psychological or ideational processes of vision was his 
theory of visual language, according to which the ideas of vision bear the same sort of 
relationship to the ideas of other senses, such as touch, as words bear to their 
referents.64 Just as through a process of association words come to suggest their 
referents, the ideas proper to vision come to suggest ideas of the tactual properties, 
such as the idea of distance. These tactual ideas constitute our experience of a three- 
dimensional world and are commonly mistaken for ideas proper to the sense of 
vision. Berkeley termed them the secondary objects of vision, thereby distinguishing 
them from properly visual ideas while recognizing that phenomenally these tactual 
ideas seem to belong to vision.65 And so according to Berkeley, our everyday experi- 
ence of the visual world results from associative connections formed between prop- 
erly visual ideas and tactual ideas, these tactual ideas being responsible for our 
perception of depth or distance.66 
62Jacques Rohault, in his System of Natural Philosophy (1671), trans. Samuel Clarke (London, 1723), 
espoused the Cartesian point-for-point transmission of the retinal image into the brain, where there arises 
"an immaterial Image, or that Sensation in which Sight properly consists" (Pt. I, Ch. 32, Secs. 1 and 2, p. 
248); he contrasted this sensation with the judgments that lead us to think we directly apprehend objects at 
a distance (ibid., Sec. 11, pp. 250-251) and with the judgments involving situation and distance, by which 
"we easily conceive what the Bigness of the Object is at a given distance" (Sec. 23, p. 254). Malebranche 
also accepted the sensory core-visual world dichotomy (Pastore, Selective History, pp. 46-49), as did 
Locke, Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (London, 1690), Bk. II, Ch. 9, Secs. 8-10. 
63Berkeley, The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained (1733), in Works on 
Vision, ed. Colin M. Turbayne (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), Secs. 37,43. Berkeley contended that the 
psychological side of visual theory had been neglected by previous writers in favor of physical considera- 
tions (ocular anatomy, the nature of light) and the study of vision in connection with lenses and mirrors. 
64Berkeley introduced his linguistic theory of vision as the conclusion of the New Theory (Secs. 147, 
148), whereas he begins with it in the later Theory of Vision Vindicated (Secs. 38-40). For a thorough 
discussion of Berkeley's linguistic theory of vision, see Turbayne, Works on Vision, editor's commentary, 
pp. vii-XlV. 
65Berkeley, New Theory, Sec. 50. 
66According to Berkeley the link between the proper and secondary (tactual) objects of vision is not 
mediated through active judgments of the intellect (as Alhazen and Descartes believed), but through a 
passive, associational process. Berkeley clearly distinguishes the associational process of suggestion from 
the judgmental process of inference in the Theory of Vision Vindicated, Secs. 42 and 16. He does speak of 
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The proper or immediate objects of vision constitute the sensory core in Berkeley's 
theory and are therefore of primary interest in the present context. In the Theory of 
Vision, or Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained (1733), Berkeley explained 
that the proper objects of vision are pictures.67 He did not mean that the mind 
directly contemplates the retinal image, for he denied that the images on the retina 
"are, or can be, the proper objects of sight"; these images are in the tangible realm, 
being "tangible figures projected by tangible rays on a tangible retina."68 While the 
images on the retina are sometimes referred to as pictures, Berkeley preferred to 
emphasize the distinction between the visual and the tactual by reserving that term 
for the visual ideas immediately present to the mind: 
Pictures, therefore, may be understood in a twofold sense, or as two kinds quite dissimilar 
and heterogeneous, the one consisting of [ideas of] light, shade, and colors; the other not 
properly pictures, but images projected on the retina. Accordingly, for distinction, I shall 
call those "pictures" and these "images." The former are visible and the peculiar objects of 
sight.69 
But, as Berkeley tells- us, while we do not perceive our retinal images, they nonetheless 
bear some correspondence to the pictures that constitute the proper objects of sight: 
It is to be noted of those inverted images on the retina that, although they are in kind 
altogether different from the proper object of sight or pictures, they may nevertheless be 
proportional to them; as indeed the most different and heterogeneous things in nature 
may, for all that, have analogy, and be proportional each to other.70 
Berkeley explained the nature of this proportionality by the extended use of an 
example involving a "diaphanous plane" divided into equal squares, similar to the 
painter's device. He compared the "image" that may be constructed upon this plane 
to the retinal image and explained that the visual "picture" itself (the proper object of 
vision) answers to the image on the diaphanous plane, in such a way that "what has 
been said of the images must in strictness be understood of the corresponding 
pictures."'71 Thus, according to Berkeley, the proper objects of vision are visual ideas 
of light and color, phenomenally present as a picture; this picture is correlated with 
"sudden judgments" in the New Theory (Sec. 20), but when he comes to explain the connection between 
the immediate and mediate objects of vision, he speaks of one idea "suggesting" another and not of 
inferences from one idea to another (Secs. 45, 47, 50, 51, etc.). 
67Some passages in the earlier New Theory may suggest that Berkeley did not include form (retinally 
projected shape) among the proper objects of vision, from which it would follow that the immediate object 
of sight could not be a picturelike correlate of the retinal projection (e.g., Sec. 29; cf. Pastore, Selective 
History, pp. 72-73). Berkeley did deny that sight and touch perceive a common set of shaped and extended 
objects (New Theory, Secs. 127-143). Instead, he maintained that the visual shape and magnitude are ideas 
different in kind from tactual shape and magnitude, and thus that visual space (as represented in the 
immediate object of vision) and tactual space constitute separate, independent realms (Secs. 136-143). 
Thus even though he denied that vision immediately apprehends the spatial world of touch, he did include 
peculiarly visual spatial ideas within the proper objects of vision. 
68 Theory of Vision Vindicated, Sec. 142. 
69 Ibid., Sec. 51. Berkeley's statement that the proper object of vision is a picture should not be taken in a 
boringly literal sense to imply that the proper object of vision is planar and hence localized in three- 
dimensional space. It was perhaps to avoid the long arguments surrounding the problem of geometry (New 
Theory, Secs. 149-158)-arguments easily misread as a denial that form is proper to vision-that Berkeley 
chose simply to characterize the proper objects as "pictures" in the more popular Theory of Vision 
Vindicated. 
70 Theory of Vision Vindicated, Sec. 53. 
7lIbid., Sec. 57. 
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the retinal image, but it is not our retinal images that we see.72 
The fact that the ideas proper to vision are correlates of the retinal image while our 
everyday visual experience is of the visual world was not something that Berkeley 
could pass over without comment. As Berkeley admitted, "we cannot, without great 
pains, cleverly separate and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight 
from those of touch which are connected with them."73 The result is that we do not 
experience the sensory core in its primitive form, but only its elaboration into the 
visual world. Yet a key premise in Berkeley's own polemic against the "received view" 
(that vision results from judgments of lines and angles) was that "no idea which is not 
itself perceived can be the means of perceiving any other idea."74 An obvious tension 
arises. Berkeley surmounted this apparent embarrassment by drawing attention to a 
similar occurrence in the perception of speech: even though we must hear the words 
of the speaker in order to understand the thought that they convey, we hardly notice 
the words themselves, but pay attention to the meaning, and "even act in all respects 
as if we heard the very thoughts themselves."75 The difficulty that we experience in 
separating the proper objects of vision from the ideas of touch 
... will not seem strange to us, if we consider how hard it is for anyone to hear the words 
of his native language pronounced in his ears without understanding them. Though he 
endeavors to disunite the meaning from the sound, it, will nevertheless intrude into his 
thoughts, and he shall find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly in 
the posture of a foreigner that never learned the language, so as to be affected barely with 
the sounds themselves and not perceive the signification annexed to them.76 
While Berkeley is essentially repeating the argument from habit found in Descartes 
and Alhazen, the metaphor of speech perception provides concreteness to the claim 
that we perceive the proper objects of vision and yet are not aware of them as such. 
We give primary attention to the ideas of touch because, just as with the meanings of 
words, they are found to be functionally significant. It is the tactual world of mediate 
vision with which our tactual body must interact and from which it can receive 
injury. 77 
The reasons that could be put forth for Berkeley's allegiance to the distinction 
between ideas of vision and touch, and thus to a typically unnoticed form of visual 
experience distinct from the visual world, would take us far into his immaterialism.78 
72Thus while we agree with Gary Thrane's assertion, in his "Berkeley's 'Proper Object of Vision,"' 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 1977, 38:243-260, that Berkeley's proper object of vision is a "free- 
floating" bidimensional array, we cannot agree that Berkeley took the proper object of vision to be the 
retinal image itself (pp. 243, 255). On Berkeley's immaterialistic account, the flow of causality is not 
from the "photosensitive surface" of the retina to the mind, but from God to the mind; the surface of 
the retina is in the "tangible realm" and can be known only through tactual ideas. 
73New Theory, Sec. 159. 
74Ibid., Sec. 10. 
75Ibid., Sec. 51. 
76Ibid., Sec. 73. 
77Ibid., Secs. 59, 147. 
78As an immaterialist, Berkeley could not allow that sight and touch perceive the same objects; he must 
show that the visual world that we seem to directly apprehend, and which agrees with our tactual ideas, is 
really mediately perceived by means of those same tactual ideas (or, rather, by means of associative 
connections established with previous tactual ideas), from which our properly visual ideas are really quite 
distinct. On his immaterialist account, each of the senses constitutes a separate realm, so that any regular 
connection between the ideas of separate sensory modalities is owing not to the fact that a single object is 
being sensed but to the benevolence of God in providing us with a coherent set of sensory ideas that 
exhibit cross-modal regularities (New Theory, Sec. 147; Theory of Vision Vindicated, Secs. 38-40, 29). For 
a recent study of Berkeley's immaterialism and theory of vision, see George Pitcher, Berkeley (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). 
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The particular form that Berkeley attributed the proper objects of vision may, 
however, be understood in terms of the received tenets of visual theory. Berkeley 
found it to be "agreed by all that distance of itself and immediately, cannot be seen,"79 
and thus he could use tradition to support his view that the proper object of vision 
contains no direct representation of the third dimension and is a correlate of the 
retinal projection. In essence, he simply accepted from the optical tradition the 
theoretical postulation of a mental correlate to the retinal image. When he described 
the properties of the proper objects of vision in his New Theory, he described them in 
a manner that would be consistent with a mental correlate of the retinal image, but 
provided no argument for doing so.80 He apparently assumed the point would be 
obvious enough, as it would have been to anyone familiar with previous visual 
theory. He certainly did not provide an argument based upon an empirical confronta- 
tion with the pure proper objects of vision themselves, and in fact spent more effort 
than had Descartes in explaining away the lack of such confrontation. And when in 
Visual Language he sought to provide a detailed explication of the proper objects of 
vision, he turned to the painter's device for constructing a projective drawing, not to 
any special phenomenological considerations. 
In sum, even though Berkeley disputed many features of the received theory of 
vision, he did not dispute the view that our immediate visual experience is a picture- 
like correlate of the retinal image. In this sense Berkeley's proper object of vision may 
be identified with Descartes' second grade of sensation. There is, however, a shift in 
emphasis. With Berkeley the fact that the proper object of vision is potentially 
experienceable no longer remains in the background. This shift of emphasis was in 
part brought about simply by the fact that Berkeley devoted more effort than had 
Descartes to developing his psychology of vision, in which the key distinction was 
that between the immediate and mediate objects of vision (sensory core and visual 
world). But underlying Berkeley's special concern to treat vision solely in terms of 
ideational processes was his immateralist metaphysics, in which to be is to be per- 
ceived is to be an idea in the mind of a perceiver.81 Insofar as Berkeley's metaphys- 
ics served to emphasize the distinction between the immediate and mediate objects 
of vision as two ideational states, it left its mark on subsequent visual theory. For 
after Berkeley the distinction between the sensory core and visual world became a 
widely accepted feature of visual theory, and remained so throughout the nineteenth 
century. While the view that the sensory core is fundamental in the process of vision 
has been strongly challenged, it retains adherents even today.82 
CONCLUSION 
When the concept of sensory core emerged in the seventeenth century, it was a 
product of theory rather than of new phenomenological techniques. The crucial 
development was the inclusion in Descartes' visual theory of a distinction between 
79New Theory, Sec. 2. 
80Berkeley introduces the distinction between the immediate and mediate objects of vision in Sec. 50 of 
the New Theory and proceeds to describe their respective properties without further ado. 
81Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Dublin, 1710), Pt. I, Sec, 3. 
82The challenges to the concept of sensory core provide gauges of its prior acceptance: see William 
James, Principles of Psychology (New York/London, 1890), Vol. II, pp. 203-282, and Wolfgang Kohler, 
Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright, 1947), Ch. 3. In the early development of the concept of "sense 
data" among philosophers, the sense data were attributed the phenomenal properties of the sensory core, 
and this seems to have been a borrowing from the psychologists (Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the 
External World, 1914, reissued, London: Allen & Unwin, 1922, pp. 75-76). A recent adherent to a notion 
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two mental states, one corresponding to the retinal image, the other to experience of 
the visual world. Descartes' theory, however, was not uniquely responsible for the 
character of the sensory core-its two-dimensional, imagelike form-but only for 
the fact that it was conceived as available to consciousness (and hence conceived as 
the mental state we have named "sensory core"). Since the time of Alhazen (or, if we 
make allowances for differences owing to extramissionism, since Ptolemy), the 
effective stimulus for vision had been conceived as an entity that provided informa- 
tion about only two dimensions of the field of vision and which therefore required 
further enrichment by means of psychological operations in order to be elaborated 
into a world in depth. Descartes accepted this view of visual stimulation and the 
operations applied to it, and translated the view into his mechanistic physiology and 
particular form of mind-body dualism. A product of the translation was that the 
initial sensing of the two-dimensional stimulus pattern came to be viewed as a mental 
event in the Cartesian sense, and therefore as an event available to consciousness. 
Berkeley, who shared Descartes' equation of the mental with the conscious, incorpor- 
ated the accepted view of visual stimulation into an associative learning theory of 
spatial perception. His immaterialism led him to have a particularly heightened 
awareness of the distinction between the sensory core and visual world. Though later 
thinkers tended not to accept Berkeley's metaphysical views, his theory of vision had 
a lasting impact. 
According to our analysis, Descartes' introduction of the concept of sensory core 
into the psychology of vision resulted in part from factors "external" to his visual 
theory. The argument is neither that Descartes' particular view of the mind and body 
demanded the concept of sensory core-we mentioned above that conceivably he 
could have developed a physiological mechanism sufficient for the generation of the 
visual world-nor that the concept is inconceivable on any other view of mind and 
body. Rather we are arguing that in fact it was the Cartesian view of mind as applied 
to the traditional conception of the visual stimulus and the psychological process of 
spatial vision that resulted in the introduction of the concept of sensory core. While 
the current state of the historiography of medieval and Renaissance psychology does 
not allow us to delve further into the matter, it appears that the significant difference 
between Descartes' view of mind and that of his medieval predecessors was Descartes' 
unification of the mind into a single, rational, conscious entity. Medieval writers, 
including those in the optical tradition, generally followed Aristotle in dividing the 
mind into parts, such as sensitive and rational, and also divided it into several 
faculties or "internal senses."83 Within this context it was appropriate to refer to 
events all along the chain of processes leading from the eye to the seat of visual 
judgment in mentalistic language, without conceiving of them all as belonging to 
consciousness. Descartes rejected the Aristotelian division of the soul. His unified 
conception of consciousness, which was dominant (though not unchallenged) well 
into the nineteenth century, provided a framework for continued adherence to the 
concept of sensory core. 
The reader may wonder why we have, in the course of this paper, focused our 
that is reminiscent of the sensory core is Irvin Rock, An Introduction to Perception (New York/ London: 
Macmillan, 1975), p. 562: "It is plausible to suppose that the first step in a very rapid process is a 
perception correlated with features of the proximal stimulus." 
83Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Sec. 1, Dist. 10, Ch. 3, p. 500, and Bk. V, Sec. 2, Dist. 3, Ch. 8, p. 543. On 
the partitioning of the mind into various internal senses, see Nicholas Steneck, "Albert the Great on the 
Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses," Isis, 1974, 65:193-21 1. 
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attention so steadfastly on the emergence of the concept of sensory core, and whether 
we have not produced a distorted picture by examining a question that does not 
obviously present itself upon an examination of either Alhazen's or Descartes' optical 
writings. We sympathize. One could write a history that emphasized the continuity 
and shared features of the psychology of vision from Alhazen to Descartes. Such a 
history would be a study of the development of one of the major viewpoints in the 
history of perceptual psychology: the view that the stimulus to vision is inherently 
impoverished with respect to the spatial properties of objects, so that the inadequate 
information contained in received stimulation must be enriched by judgmental or 
associative processes, or, to put it differently, so that the mind must construct the 
visual world by applying past experience to the inherently ambiguous sensory core. 
Our paper constitutes a portion of that history. If we have chosen to emphasize the 
concept of sensory core, it is because the notion that the psychologically fundamental 
component of the visual process is a conscious state representing the retinal projec- 
tion played such a dominant role in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century visual theory. 
Indeed, it was just that aspect of the sensory core which distinguishes it from 
Alhazen's transmitted "form"-its status as a conscious event-that became the 
target of criticism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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